

Military integration in Burundi, 2000-2006¹

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1. Introduction

This chapter describes military integration in Burundi associated with the peace process from 2000 to 2006 that ended the civil war that began in 1993. Burundi is a small, impoverished, land-locked country of approximately 8 million people (as of 2010) in the center of Africa. It has been wracked by a cycle of political violence since independence in 1962. Like neighbouring Rwanda to the north, Burundian society is marked by a caste-like stratification that has historically privileged a Tutsi minority relative to majority Hutu and a very small third group, the Twa.² Also like their neighbours in Rwanda, Burundians have struggled to escape a conflict pitting custodians of this “ranked ethnic system” (Horowitz 1985; Lemarchand, 1970) against those ostensibly seeking to remove barriers to

¹ This chapter draws on findings from the multipurpose survey on *Wartime and Post-conflict Experiences in Burundi* (2006-2010), sponsored by the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) and the United States Institute of Peace. My co-investigators on that project were Michael Gilligan, Eric Mvukiyehe, and Gwendolyn Taylor. The project was implemented in partnership with *Iteka – Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme*. I am also grateful to Henri Boshoff and Nicole Samii for comments and advice. Details of the survey are at www.columbia.edu/~cgs81/burundisurvey/.

² Conventionally, Tutsi are said to constitute 14% of Burundian society, Hutu 85%, and Twa 1%. These figures are from a 1956 colonial-era census of dubious methodological quality. Even if this was correct for the time, the current distribution is likely to differ, not least due to imbalances in mortality rates in the various crises since independence. Analysis of survey data collected by my research team in 2007 suggests that the distribution may slightly overstate the Hutu proportion, although the margins of error are quite large. Also, to the extent that electoral results from 1993 and 2005 largely reflect ethnic preferences, the 14-85-1 distribution may not be so far off.

Hutu mobility.³ This is the context within which military integration has taken place in Burundi. In the sections below, I provide details on the process by which military integration was realized after the civil war from 1993 to 2004. I follow the narrative structure of all contributions to the volume, first discussing *origins* of the military integration idea in Burundi, providing the necessary historical background. I follow by discussing the *process* by which the terms of integration were set, and then conclude by discussing the *outcomes* of the process.

2. Origins

Some historical context is necessary to understand the motivations driving the 2000-2006 military integration process. Burundi's national army, known as the *Forces armées burundaises* (FAB) from 1962 until 2004, has featured centrally in the country's bloody political drama since just after independence. In the first four years after independence in 1962, Burundian politics suffered a series of assassinations, an abortive coup by Hutu officers, repressions, and reprisal massacres. The events culminated in a purge of high ranking Hutu officers and a 1966 military coup led by the minister of defense, Captain Michel Micombero, who declared a republic. Thus began a period of *de facto* military rule and intensified concentration of economic opportunities and power, particularly within the army, into the hands of a Tutsi clique from the southern Bururi province. The clique oversaw a dramatic intensification of Hutu exclusion as well as a degree of exclusion of non-southern Tutsi. A 1972 insurrection coordinated by Hutu expatriates and Hutu army members escalated to involve massacres of Tutsis, mostly in the southern part of the country. This triggered a barbarous crackdown by the army. The crackdown went beyond restoring order and sought to prevent future uprisings by "decapitating" Hutu society. The army targeted for execution Hutus in

³This brief background is based on two types of sources. The first are field notes from extensive interviews and focus groups conducted by my research team in Burundi in 2006-2009. The second are secondary accounts including Lemarchand (1970 and 1996), Reyntjens (1993), United Nations (1996), and Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000).

positions of authority, showing signs of intellect (e.g., wearing glasses), or otherwise exhibiting leadership potential. The estimated number killed in that violence---mostly Hutu, it is thought---is 150,000-200,000, and tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Hutus were driven into neighbouring Rwanda and Tanzania (United Nations, 1996).

Competition among clan-based factions of southern Tutsi military officers shaped the next 20 years of Burundian politics. Micombero was overthrown in a 1976 coup by his Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, also a Tutsi from Bururi province. Bagaza presided over a decade of fast-paced development, although largely to the benefit of the Tutsi elite from Bururi. During this period, a number of movements emerged to contest for Hutu rights. These included the Burundian Workers Party (“UBU”) organized among Burundian émigrés in Rwanda, the *Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu* (PALIPEHUTU) and its armed wing, the *Forces nationales de libération* (FNL), headquartered in Tanzania, and the *Front pour la libération nationale* (FROLINA) and its armed wing, the *Forces armées du peuple*, also headquartered in Tanzania. Within Burundi, the army was able to contain threats emanating from these groups handily.

In 1987, Bagaza was himself overthrown in a coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya, also from Bururi. A rural uprising in the north in 1988 gave rise to another cycle of civilian massacres and another vicious army crackdown, with an estimated 5,000-20,000 killed (Loft, 1988; Chrétien et al, 1989). This event, international pressure, and increasing agitation by Hutu intellectuals convinced then President Buyoya to initiate a reconciliation and democratization process. Buyoya oversaw the promulgation of a national unity charter in 1991 and then a new constitution in 1992, which set the stage for elections in 1993. As part of this process, some places in the national officer academy, the *Institut supérieur des cadres militaires* (ISCAM), were opened to Hutu candidates. But this gesture

masked a more general resistance to army reform among the Tutsi elite. The 1992 charter declared that “the truth is that there is no discrimination within the army” (Lemarchand, 1996:139). One of the beneficiaries of this process, a Hutu from Bururi named Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, was a member of one of the integrated ISCAM classes. He would eventually defect to become a leader in the rebellion that broke out in 1993.

Members of the southern Tutsi officer class were not easily pried away from power. In peaceful and generally fair elections in 1993, Melchior Ndadaye defeated the incumbent Buyoya by a large majority in presidential race. Ndadaye was a Hutu civilian, former UBU leader, and founder of the newly formed political party, *Front pour la démocratie au Burundi* (FRODEBU). FRODEBU also took a large majority in the national assembly. FRODEBU’s platform called for the removal of many barriers to Hutu mobility, including reforms to end exclusion within institutions such as the army. The Ndadaye administration called for the rapid promotion of some Hutu officers within the military, ostensibly to better align the military officer corps with the interests of the civilian government. After only 3 months in power, Ndadaye was assassinated in a bungled coup attempt on October 21, 1993. The coup itself remains shrouded in mystery, although Burundians commonly attribute it to associates of former president Bagaza.⁴ The assassination triggered what a United Nations commission described as genocidal reprisals by Hutu mobs against Tutsi men throughout the countryside, followed by massacres of Hutus by the army (United Nations, 1996). In the ensuing ferment, the government became increasingly beholden to members of the southern Tutsi “old guard.” At the same time, members of FRODEBU left government to establish the rebel

⁴ This is based on the author’s own experience in Burundi over 2006 through 2009. Some Bagaza associates within the army had been arrested but then released as part of what the government declared as a coup attempt in 1989 (Lemarchand 1996:140).

movement, the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie* (CNDD), and its military wing, the *Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD).⁵

The army, as it was constituted, was the main target of the rebellion. The CNDD and FDD declared their intention to be the “restoration of democracy.” Explicit in their strategy for achieving this aim, and voiced publicly as early as 1994,⁶ was the defeat and dismantling of the “*armée mono-ethnique*,” so-called because the officer corps was the near-exclusive domain of southern Tutsis. Hutu men had long been admitted, and during war conscripted, into the rank-and-file. But conservative members of the Tutsi elite tended to associate Hutu officer-ship with threats along the lines of the abortive coup in 1965 and insurrection in 1972. Those members of the Tutsi elite rejected the characterization of the army as an instrument of Tutsi dominance. Rather, they saw Tutsi control over the armed forces as a necessary protection against “genocidal” or “revolutionary” tendencies that could be activated at any moment among the Hutu masses.⁷ The FNL and FROLINA had since their inception made appeals for reconstituting the army in their call for more general Hutu liberation, although Ndadaye’s assassination concentrated minds intensely on the problems with the army. The phrase *armée mono-ethnique* reflected the sense among those sympathizing with the rebellion that for decades, the army and police were mainly instruments of southern Tutsi domination. Thus, the rebels and their sympathizers singled out the *armée mono-*

⁵ Ndayikengurukiye led the FDD.

⁶ Author’s interviews with Léonard Nyangoma, founding leader of the CNDD, and Col. Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, founding leader of the FDD, Bujumbura, 2006.

⁷ As late as 2001, the leader of a hard-line faction of the long-dominant UPRONA party, Charles Mukasi, declared in a letter to the United Nations Security Council, “Au Burundi, il n’y a pas de loi interdisant aux Hutu l’accès à l’armée. La réalité est que l’armée burundaise n’est pas monoethnique. Il y a des circonstances historiques qui ont fait que, depuis 1972, les Hutu soient minoritaires au sein de ces corps : (i) La répression contre le génocide de 1972 fut aveugle, maladroite et coupable. (ii) L’exclusion ethniste et régionaliste sous les régimes Bagaza, Buyoya fut pratiquée. (iii) Des campagnes du Frodebu et du Palipehutu sous le régime Ntibantunganya, destinées à empêcher le Hutu de se faire enrôler dans l’armée pour nourrir la propagande raciste et génocidaire du Frodebu furent menées.”

ethnique as the key obstacle to democratization, Hutu mobility, and justice for past abuses perpetrated by the state.

The army (FAB), FDD, FNL, and FROLINA fought in a civil war that lasted until 2004. Small scale residual violence due to a splinter FNL faction continued until 2008. War-related violence touched all regions of the country, and conventional estimates put the death toll by 2004 at 300,000 and the number displaced at 500,000.⁸ A peace process began in 1996. Agreements signed by the warring parties in Arusha in 2000 and Pretoria in 2003 ushered in genuine peace. The FDD forces were largely successful on the battlefield, although the FAB forces were not defeated outright. These rebel successes are reflected in the agreements, whose provisions constitute a near revolution in the country's distribution of power. This outcome was consolidated when the CNDD-FDD (the party formed from the politico-military movement) won large majorities in the national assembly and local councils in the 2005 elections. The agreements also set out in extraordinary detail institutional reforms, including the integration of members from the FAB and all of the rebel factions into a new security forces.

As discussed above, the rebellion set as an explicit goal the defeat and dismantling of the army. The issue was not easily resolved in the peace negotiations. Negotiations to end the war opened in 1996. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere mediated a formal process between members of major political parties that had not gone underground. The Catholic humanitarian network, *Comunita di Sant'Egidio*, facilitated covert meetings between the CNDD-FDD leadership and Burundian government representatives. In the latter talks, the rebels issued their demand to dismantle the army and police

⁸ These are the figures commonly reported in the press. These figures are well within the credible bounds that I am able to establish with survey data collected by my research team in 2007. The survey included over 1,000 adult civilians and over 2,000 former civil war combatants.

as they were currently constituted, and then to create a new security force. Members of the old forces would be no more or less eligible to join the new security force than anyone else. Obviously, the representatives of the ruling faction rejected this idea. When faced with this same demand from the FNL during the negotiations in 2006, members of the military old guard in Burundi were prone to state that there can be no justification to dismantle a military “unvanquished.”⁹ The FAB elite tended to scoff at the idea that anyone other than themselves, with their considerable formal training, could manage the security affairs of the country. At the same time, the message became clear that some kind of army reform would be necessary. However, members of the ruling faction initially perceived the situation as a “problem of merely integrating a few rebel elements into the armed forces” (Nindorera, 2007:11). The rebels nonetheless persisted in their dismantlement demand.

The “integration” agenda moved forward once the Tanzania talks picked up again in 1998 in Arusha. By that time, the ruling faction and army were pressured from various directions, including international sanctions, a lack of battlefield progress, and a sense of fatigue beginning to set in among the population. The rebel movements had begun to splinter by this time. The largest rebel factions---that is, the core FDD and FNL factions---remained defiant and spurned the formal negotiations. When the formal talks resumed in Arusha, the facilitators had the delegates form committees to investigate (i) the nature of the conflict, genocide, and exclusion; (ii) democracy and good governance; (iii) peace and security for all; and (iv) reconstruction and development.¹⁰ It was in the third committee that discussions turned to principles that should govern a reformed security sector. Nyerere’s passing in October 1999 prompted Nelson Mandela to take up the facilitation role, who is credited with reinvigorating the talks. Agreement was hard to come by initially. But

⁹ Interview with Lt. Gen. Germain Niyoyankana, Burundi’s Defense Minister, Bujumbura, 2006.

¹⁰ A fifth committee was eventually established to discuss implementation.

continued international pressure, including international condemnation for the *regroupement* (concentration camp) strategies used in the counter-insurgency (IRIN, 2000), combined with continued degradation of the domestic situation to spur on the negotiations. As of April 2000, the International Crisis Group reported that no agreement had yet been reached on military reform, although the Tanzanian and South African facilitation team put forward a proposal at that time to integrate members from the “armed political groups” (that is, rebel groups) into a reconstituted security forces (International Crisis Group, 2000:7). The delegates to the third committee reached out to the FDD and FNL factions outside the talks, though with no success.

At this point it is worth recounting how the interests of the various factions were arrayed relative to the proposal to integrate the armed forces. At the one end were the large FDD and FNL factions who remained outside the negotiations. The FDD faction’s armed forces numbered around 20,000-30,000, and they had the political support of the largest segment of Burundians.¹¹ As of 2000, they had not yet signalled a willingness to accept anything short of “dismantlement” of the army. This defiance reflected confidence, it seems, in their battlefield prospects. The FNL, whose forces numbered much less---somewhere around 3,000---seemed to bank on a different strategy. Hard-line opposition to the integration proposal was a way for the FNL to maintain its ideological purity as the true champions of “Hutu liberation.” With bases relatively secure in rugged enclaves around Burundi’s capital of Bujumbura, FNL hardliners could rely on continued spoiling and terrorist tactics to coerce a deal out of whatever powers would come to be. They could play a game of one-upmanship, taking as given any concessions won by the CNDD-FDD and then attempting to win public favour as the true champions of Hutu liberation by demanding even more (Samii, 2007).

¹¹ Force size estimates are based on figures determined in the post-war demobilization and reintegration process. Refer to World Bank (2004).

At the other end of the spectrum were the Bururi-based Tutsi elite. They were represented by some factions, for example the UPRONA faction led by Charles Mukasi, who also remained outside the peace process. While their numbers were few, this was compensated by their considerable wealth and connections. Their opposition to integration rested on beliefs already outlined above: their control over the security sector was essential to enforce their privilege; less cynically, this control was necessary to protect against “genocidal” or, more realistically, retributive tendencies among the Hutu masses. These hardliners found allies among the military officer class, many of whom felt they were uniquely qualified to run the armed forces. With their education in European military academies, they scoffed at the idea of sharing ranks with rebels coming in from “the bush”. But this professionalism cut both ways: those who were not deeply tied into the network of Bururi privilege would likely accept any order to integrate were it to come from the political authorities with the endorsement of the international community.¹² Between these two extremes were factions whose willingness to compromise was largely due to their need to find some way to secure their political futures without having at their disposal any military means. This included the heads of small rebel splinter factions (including the CNDD’s founder, Léonard Nyangoma, who was ousted in 1998) and most members of the embattled political parties, FRODEBU and UPRONA.

With heavy cajoling by the South African mediation team and the personal intervention of US President Bill Clinton, the parties in Arusha reached a formal compromise in August 2000. Relative to other ceasefire agreements and peace accords, the Arusha Accords were extraordinary in the elaborateness and enlightened manner in which they sought to address Burundi’s political ills. This reflects a few things. First, the Tanzanian and South African mediators worked in good faith and

¹² From my interviews with members of the Burundian officer corps, I believe that as of 2000 many understood that international norms had changed, and that their freedom to act in 2000 was not the same as it had been when, for example, the Algerian military was essentially free to cancel the 1991 elections in that country.

drew on a wealth of transition experience. The South Africans were particularly well-positioned to help, having recently completed integrating rebel African National Congress *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) forces into the new post-apartheid military. In many ways, the challenges facing Burundi echoed what the South Africans had just gone through, and the South African mediators could use this similar experience to gain the trust of the Burundian protagonists. Second, while many accused the participating Burundian elite of venality¹³, the intellectual capital among the participants was high. With the main rebel factions outside the process, the mediators and Burundian elite created a document that illustrated what “could be.” It was essentially a constitution for a new Burundi, although without the political backing necessary for its implementation. Nonetheless, the thoroughness of the proposals could be used as a strategy to win over masses as well as a critical share of the outstanding FDD and FNL membership.

The Accords provided extensive guidance on army and police reform. The Accords established a rule of “ethnic balance” such that posts would be allocated to Hutus and Tutsis in a 50-50 manner, and the overall composition of the security forces was to be balanced in this way “in view of the need to achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and *coups d'état*” (Protocol II, chapter 1, article 11). The army and police were to be non-partisan and to be non-engaged in politics. The new police forces should be “community oriented,” which meant that police contingents should be composed mostly of people from the community that they patrolled.¹⁴ War criminals and coup plotters should be excluded from the reformed security forces. In addition, the Accords opened the door for integration of members of the “armed political parties” (that is, the rebel factions participating in the Arusha process) to be admitted directly into a reconstituted national security

¹³ A posh new suburb in northern Bujumbura is called the “Arusha quarter,” so-called because the sparkling mansions there were allegedly built with the stipends received by participants in the Arusha talks.

¹⁴ In the past, police contingents were made up of officers drawn from other parts of the country---often from Bururi. This was seen as a source of the often brutal nature with which the police enforced the government’s will locally.

forces. Certain qualification requirements would have to be met, although the Accords did call for accelerated training of those integrated from the armed political parties. Some portion of both FAB and armed political party members would be demobilized. A joint technical committee was to be formed to specify the precise size of the forces, numbers to be admitted respectively from the FAB and armed political parties, harmonization of ranks, and timelines. The committee would include members of the FAB, the armed political parties, as well as representatives from the African Union and UN.

The Arusha Accords neither marked the end of the war nor did they immediately draw the outstanding FDD and FNL factions into the peace process. For three years, the Arusha Accords remained mostly a paper exercise. The rotation of transitional heads of state was implemented, with FRODEBU leader Domitien Ndayizeye succeeding Buyoya as president of the transitional government in April 2003. But the proposed elections, peacekeeping operation, and transitional justice processes were put off as the war continued.

Nonetheless, the Accords were a large step forward relative to the “denialism” that marked the National Unity Charter’s approach to the army a decade earlier. The Accords were unequivocal about integrating rebel factions (using the euphemism of “armed political parties”) into a new military. In contemporary conflicts in which rebel forces have drawn government armies to a draw on the battlefield, such has not always been the case. For example, Cote d’Ivoire’s 2003 Linas-Marcoussis agreement and Nepal’s 2006 ceasefire emerged in roughly similar political and military settings. But each was terribly vague about rebel integration into a new army. In both cases, this vagueness developed into a major sticking point that held up the political transitions. The Arusha Accords’ “50% rule,” by which post assignments and the overall composition of the military would

be ethnically balanced, addressed the discrimination problem in a remarkably frank manner. One can contrast this to the post-war situation in neighbouring Rwanda, where the government under Paul Kagame strictly forbade reference to ethnic identity. Of course, FNL sympathizers in Burundi are quick to point out that a 50% rule is far from providing for a “proper” reflection of the ethnic balance of the country. Indeed, from my own conversations with Burundians from different parts of the country and walks of life, I believe that empathy for this perspective is widely held among those who identify as Hutu. However, I have found that most of those empathizing with this view also appreciate that the costs of pushing for a larger share for Hutus is simply not worth it.

3. Creation

With the Arusha Accords in the background, the creation of an integrated military occurred through power-sharing negotiations between the CNDD-FDD, the transitional government, and the high officer corps of the FAB. The Arusha Accords continued to provide the basic structure for the power-sharing agreements, with these new negotiations filling in details. South African mediators and experts worked alongside representatives from Tanzania and Uganda to keep the peace process going and offer detailed proposals.¹⁵ On the battlefield, the FDD demonstrated that it could control large swathes of the Burundian countryside, but the FAB also showed that it would not be vanquished any time soon. Politically, the CNDD-FDD began to sense, by late 2002, that while large segments of the population supported their war aims, they risked losing such backing as war fatigue spread.¹⁶ While the CNDD-FDD’s increasingly sense the need for a deal, they remained reluctant to accept the formulas of the Arusha Accords---particularly 50-50 ethnic balance in the military. The CNDD-FDD leadership initially viewed with great suspicion the South African

¹⁵ After Arusha, the South African mediation team was led by Deputy President Jacob Zuma, with President Thabo Mbeki stepping in a key moments.

¹⁶ This understanding comes from our research team’s interviews with CNDD-FDD officers, including Col. Prime Niyongabo, Brig.-Gen. Silas Ntigurirwa, and Col. Manasse Nzobonimpa, as well as with many lower ranking officers.

mediators who pushed for acceptance of this formula, accusing them of pro-Tutsi bias. An important task for the mediation team was to gain the trust of the CNDD-FDD and to persuade them of the practical necessity of sticking with formula (Southall, 2006:119-122). Increasingly, the FNL took on the role of a spoiler.

The government and CNDD-FDD struck a ceasefire agreement in December 2002. The parties reaffirmed the Arusha Accords' provisions on military restructuring. They called for a two-phase process of first integrating the armed forces, and then rationalizing the size and structure of the force according to a new security doctrine. Remarkably, the ceasefire also called for the FAB and CNDD-FDD to establish "joint military units" to fight the FNL and end the war. The ceasefire broke down within a month, however. Some have claimed that this breakdown was entirely avoidable, due mostly to a spiral of mistrust that could have been prevented with intercession by a peacekeeping force (Boshoff, 2003). Indeed, as they resumed their mediation in the summer of 2003, the South African leadership had their military move aggressively to organize an African Union intercession force that could be quickly deployed to stabilize a ceasefire, anticipated to happen before the end of 2003.

The transitional government, FAB high officer corps, and the CNDD-FDD agreed on a detailed plan for establishing an integrated military through negotiations in Pretoria in late 2003. Intense South African mediation in autumn 2003 led the transitional government and CNDD-FDD leadership to strike a new ceasefire agreement in October. This was quickly followed by negotiations over power-sharing. As in Arusha, technical experts from South Africa provided substantial input into the process. Among the agreements signed in Pretoria was the November

2003 “Forces Technical Agreement” (FTA).¹⁷ The FTA laid out in considerable detail the terms through which rebel forces and the FAB would be integrated into a new military.

The FTA upheld guidelines from the Arusha Accords and then filled in details. Specifically, it mandated the creation of a supervisory body, the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), as well as a third-party African Union peacekeeping mission---the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The JCC was a subsidiary committee of the Implementation Monitoring Committee, which included representatives of the transitional government, CNDD-FDD, and the other smaller armed factions who were parties to the Arusha Accords. The JCC brought together the military leaders from these parties. The JCC operated under a United Nations mandate with facilitators from the UN and African Union. The FTA stated that the FAB rank structure would be maintained and that the JCC would rule on the rank qualifications of those integrated from the rebel forces. Members of the rebel factions would be subject to a cantonment and verification process supervised by the JCC. The FTA spelled out specific education requirements for commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank-and-file.¹⁸ It called for an integrated army top officer echelon with 60% FAB officers and 40% CNDD-FDD officers, and a 65-35 FAB to CNDD-FDD breakdown for the integrated police top officer echelon. Throughout the ranks, a principle of “ethnic equilibrium (50/50)” would be observed.¹⁹ A small share of lower posts, approximately 10%, would be allocated to officers from the other armed parties. The FTA also provided for the establishment of the joint

¹⁷ Boshoff, who served as military technical adviser to the South African mediation team, called this agreement as the step that allowed the parties to “overcome what has been perhaps *the* major stumbling block in the Burundi peace process” (Boshoff and Gasana, 2003:1).

¹⁸ All members of the forces were required to be volunteers, physically fit, and Burundian nationals. As for education, officers were required to have an advanced degree or experience as an officer, non-commissioned officers were to have a high school degree or experience as a non-commissioned officer, and rank-and-file were to have primary school education or experience as a soldier. Experience was to be judged during the verification process, and would involve demonstration of military skills before representatives of the JCC. Informally,-the FAB also used an age cut off of 45 years, although some exceptions were allowed to this rule.

¹⁹ Note that the ethnic balance rule did not imply a 50-50 split along rebel/FAB lines, because some portion (around 17% according to our survey data) of the FAB rank-and-file were Hutu.

military units: approximately 7,000 CNDD-FDD soldiers would join the FAB for approximately two months of training to then fight the FNL.

Within the JCC, a two-phase integration process was foreseen. The first phase was the “integration” phase, which would run from 2004 to approximately 2006. During this phase, some 26,000 members of the rebel armies would be integrated alongside 40,000 members from the FAB to form a new national army and police force. 14,000 soldiers would be demobilized immediately, of which 5,000 would come from the FAB and 9,000 from the rebel forces.²⁰ The second phase was the “rationalization” phase, to begin in 2006 and for an indefinite period. The national army would be trimmed down to a target of 25,000 as quickly as possible, and a “community” oriented police would be trimmed to about 20,000.

As the JCC went about its work in early 2004, an initial sticking point was in the harmonization of ranks for rebel soldiers to the rank structure of the FAB. As discussed above, FAB elite officers often scoffed at the idea that they should share ranks with “officers” from rebel forces, few of whom had formal training. The distribution over ranks within the rebel forces suggested a degree of “rank inflation,” in that early rank promotions were used within the rebel forces as a way to boost morale, given that other incentives, such as pay raises, were not available.²¹ As Jackson (2006) notes, “given the Tutsi dominance of the old army’s command, this was a wedge issue to the peace process as a whole” (22). Ultimately, FAB officers and CNDD-FDD officers worked among themselves outside the JCC to determine the appropriate rank harmonization formula, with the small groups then being “forced to fall in behind the new arrangements” (ibid.). Thus, the CNDD-FDD and FAB pushed potential spoilers and fundamentally irrelevant parties to the side in order to solve this

²⁰ Outcomes of this reintegration process are studied in Gilligan, Mvukiyeye, and Samii (2010).

²¹ Interviews with Ndayikengurukiye and Niyoyankana, Bujumbura, 2006.

difficult problem. For the most part, rebels were downgraded based on a fixed schedule to a rank in the FAB structure that was more appropriate to one's level of training and experience (BBC Monitoring, 2005).

Survey data with members of the new armed forces suggests that the conditions for successful integration were rather favorable when one considers the characteristics of the ex-rebel and ex-FAB soldiers themselves. The 2007 *Wartime and Postconflict Experiences in Burundi* survey included interviews with a random sample of 496 members of the new army, of which 134 were from the rebel forces, and 618 members of the new police, of which 231 were from the rebel forces.²² In general, the former rebels had higher satisfaction with peace accords than their ex-FAB counterparts, and they were much more hopeful about prospects for peace. But there was near consensus among ex-rebels and ex-FAB that “war fatigue” made it necessary and desirable to end the war. Ex-rebels tend to be 2 years younger than ex-FAB (a median of 28 versus 30), and ex-rebels were 24% less likely to have completed primary school. However, there was no education gap at higher levels (secondary, university), indicating that the real difference in educational qualifications was concentrated among the rank-and-file. The ex-FAB tended to have more soldiering experience, but the gap only becomes pronounced when looking at armed forces members with more than 12 years of experience; this gap is mostly due to the timing of the war's onset.²³ Whereas 96% of ex-FAB indicated that they had seen written codes of conduct, 79% of ex-rebels indicated the same. Most of the ex-rebel respondents are from the CNDD-FDD. The high rate of exposure to written codes of conduct reflects the level of organization that the CNDD-FDD had achieved, both politically and militarily. Indeed, with its congressional assemblies and highly

²² See footnote 1.

²³ While the FNL and FROLINA had been fighting for decades, the mass rebellion led by the CNDD-FDD started in 1994, in which case most rebels could only have had at most 10 years experience as of 2004.

organized military, the CNDD-FDD had evolved into a provisional state by about 2001. Thus, in my opinion, the evidence shows that the human capital gap between the ex-rebels and ex-FAB were not so great. The education gap among the rank-and-file might appear to be the most problematic, but even here the gap is not so large. The experience gap in terms of years of service at the top echelons was less consequential given near continuous battlefield exposure and the offers of training from European partners.

Training programs were an important element of the implementation process, with many foreign partners contributing to the effort (United Nations, 2004; IRIN, 2005; Nindorera, 2007:12; Powell, 2007:26-27). To achieve rank harmonization, the Belgian government provided bridging training to rebel officers at their Royal Military Academy and Royal Defence Institute; the Netherlands, France, China, Sudan, South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt ran other training programs either in Burundi or at home country military academies. The Belgians and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB, by its French acronym) conducted “professionalization” programs to inculcate a sense of national purpose that transcended ethnic and political divisions.²⁴ The United States Agency for International Development sponsored the Burundi Leadership Training Program, which brought elite political and military figures from different factions together in confidence-building games and seminars. In addition to the technical assistance provided through these training programs, UN peacekeepers were present at the training of the joint CNDD-FDD/FAB units, and Belgian and Dutch officers were seconded to the Burundian Defense Ministry. The presence of such third parties most likely contributed to the confidence of soldiers from both the FAB and the rebel forces. In interviews with officers both from the FAB and rebel forces, soldiers on both sides initially approached the integration process with a great deal of skepticism and, at times, resentment. But as

²⁴ Samii (2010) studies the effects of participation in the integrated armed forces on perceptions of ethnic identity among Burundian combatants.

far as I have been able to tell, there were no incidents of violence during these training processes, and in general, things proceeded smoothly.²⁵

As with Tanzanian and South African assistance in the peace process, these international contributions to the training process were generally benevolent. Above, I compared the thoroughness of the military integration agreement in Burundi to the troublesome vagueness of the agreements in Cote d'Ivoire and Nepal. Using the same comparison, another difference is noteworthy. External assistance to the target countries on those cases has been complicated by the looming presence of a hegemonic outside country---France in the case of Cote d'Ivoire and India in the case of Nepal. No such conditions complicated matters with respect to Burundi, although Belgium's historical colonial ties to Burundi probably provided special motivation. Perhaps most important was the sense that while Burundi's crisis was primarily domestic, a stable Burundi could make things much less complicated in negotiating the transitions in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda.²⁶ The transition in Burundi benefitted from these benign motivations.

4. Outcome

As described above, the CNDD-FDD's grand political strategy required military integration as a condition for peace, and the vast majority of Burundians supported this aim. It was their success on the battlefield that ensured that this became a reality rather than a replay of 1972. Military integration also provided spoils that were used to build consensus. In these ways, integration was crucial to the ending of the war. In a technical sense, the reintegration process was successful at the

²⁵ Interview with Col. (ret.) Henri Boshoff, who was ONUB's lead military technical advisor.

²⁶ Indeed, certain units from the CNDD-FDD had been active as mercenary forces for the Joseph Kabila government some years prior to the Pretoria peace process. Interview with Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, who led CNDD-FDD units that fought on behalf of Kabila, Bujumbura, 2006.

time of writing in mid-2010. Once agreement was struck in Pretoria, the process advanced more or less according to a rational, deliberative process. At the same time, continual attempts by political parties to either use the military for political gain or accuse it of playing such a role have threatened these achievements.

The new armed forces have demonstrated effectiveness on the battlefield, but at the same time they have been involved in documented instances of abuse. The combined ex-FAB and ex-CNDD-FDD forces fought determinedly against the FNL to bring them to the negotiating table. Abuses were documented in the conduct of the counter-insurgency (Human Rights Watch, 2007; All Africa, 2007). This included the execution and imprisonment of civilians suspected as supporting the FNL. This most notorious was the massacre of 31 civilians in a 2006 incident in Muyinga province. On a positive note, though, the military responded to pressure from the United Nations and international NGOs, launching an investigation and ultimately convicting the key perpetrators in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The new Burundian army also deployed two battalions in 2007 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Their contribution to the mission has been substantial. After three years in the mission, the Burundian troops were exposed to a fair amount of active engagement, suffering 29 killed and 17 wounded, including the death of the Burundian Major General Juvenal Niyonguruza, AMISOM's deputy commander, in a suicide attack in September 2009. Back home, since 2005, there have been no reported incidents of violence indicative of systematic problems, although there have been reports of some isolated, idiosyncratic events.²⁷

²⁷ For example, in 2006 a dispute between a private and sergeant resulted in some shooting (Net Press, 2006), and a dispute over pay among members of the AMISOM contingents resulted in 33 soldiers being arrested for mutiny in 2010 (BBC, 2010).

More worrying are the ways in which the army, police, and intelligence services have been implicated in struggles between the major political parties, often in a manner tinged with inter-ethnic discord. In this way, Burundian society has not yet escaped the legacy of their military being a central agent in and venue for political contention. During the 2005 elections, the head of the United Nations mission, ONUB, accused Tutsi members of the army of committing small scale attacks to sow a sense of insecurity and depress voter turnout (Associated Press, 2005). The intelligence services have been implicated in violent repression of critics and opponents of the ruling CNDD-FDD (Human Rights Watch, 2006; 2009). Affiliates of the CNDD-FDD within the intelligence services, army, and presidential offices also launched a series of arrests and investigations associated with an alleged coup plot in 2006. Among those implicated were a few non-CNDD-FDD aligned members of the armed forces (including one ex-FAB officer), FNL splinter group leader, Alain Mugabarbona, and former president Domitien Ndayizeye. All those arrested were eventually let go, and as a noteworthy signal of his unwillingness to play according to the CNDD-FDD's script, defense minister Lt. Gen. Germain Niyoyankana (ex-FAB) claimed that the members of the army had been falsely accused (Reuters, 2006). Overt ethnic tensions have occasionally surfaced. For example, in 2007, members of the UPRONA party accused the ruling CNDD-FDD of not respecting the 50-50 ethnic balance principle in the assignment of posts in the police, although nothing came of these accusations (Agence France Press, 2007). Finally, while the Arusha agreement puts forward the principle of political non-engagement for security force members, slots have in fact been allocated on the basis of past political affiliation (namely, FAB, CNDD-FDD, or FNL). When speaking with soldiers, one gets the sense that such affiliations remain salient.

The defiance of the defense minister relative to the 2006 coup-plotting accusations made by those aligned with the ruling CNDD-FDD brings into sharp relief the issue of control over the military.

At the dawn of integration, ex-FAB officers constituted the bulk of the officership, although former CNDD-FDD members were placed in key positions and have been elevated over the years.²⁸ The new military operates under the scrutiny of foreign officers seconded from the Netherlands and Belgium to Burundi's defense ministry. The authority of the seconded officers is boosted by the substantial aid that their countries provide to Burundi. This balance of ex-FAB presence and CNDD-FDD presence, domestic presence and international presence, provides a mechanism to reduce the risk of any one political group gaining "subjective" control (Huntington, 1957) of the military institutions. Thus major deployments such as the AMISOM mission are decided, in effect, by consensus among these actors. Legitimate authority over the military as an institution is embodied by this coalition of ex-FAB, CNDD-FDD members, and bilateral partners. But as suggested by the cases of abuse listed above, factions inside the army, police, and intelligence forces remained tied to political bosses and have proven willing to do their bosses' dirty work.

"Right-sizing" has been a secondary priority, and this raises questions about sustainability. Phase I was completed by the fall of 2005. Phase II was still in effect at the time of writing in mid 2010. A South Africa-brokered ceasefire with the remaining FNL faction in 2008 resulted in 3,500 of its members being integrated into the new army and police forces in 2009. Adding these outcomes to estimates of the size of the national forces in 2007 (Nindorera, 2007:12), I estimate that the FDN's size in 2010 was approximately 30,000 with about one third originating from the rebel groups. The police forces numbered about 22,000, again with about one-third originating from the rebel groups. The number demobilized totaled approximately 30,000, with about two thirds having originated in the rebel forces. The current size of the military is thus above the target set out in the FTA. A military of this size, or even of the size prescribed in the FTA, is unsustainable without major

²⁸ For example, the CNDD-FDD dominated Senate appointed ex-FDD commander, Maj.-Gen. Godfroid Niyombare, to succeed Maj.- Gen. Samuel Gahiro (ex-FAB) as the army chief of staff in April 2009.

financial assistance from donor governments. These donors have regularly expressed their concern about Burundi's army, police, and intelligence services being too large and too costly (e.g., BBC Monitoring, 2008). Military expenditures hovered around 4-5% percent of GDP from 2006-8, which is more than double the average share spent by Burundi's co-members in the East African Economic Community---Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda (SIPRI, 2010).

In terms of political sustainability, we can ask whether the pact on a 50-50 ethnic balance within the military is likely to stick. So long as the memories of war remain fresh, it would seem so. Evidence comes from the negotiations that brought the FNL into the peace process. During the negotiations leading up to the FNL's integration, the FNL leadership once more put forward a demand to dismantle the current armed forces and to entirely reconstitute them to reflect the country's true ethnic balance. As discussed above, while much of the Burundian public may have been (and likely remains) sympathetic to the idea, the FNL was not able to inspire any public demonstrations in support of this proposition. Likely, war weariness and a desire to move on caused the vast majority of Burundians to oppose dismantlement, at least at this time. As such, the FNL had to accept integration into the military under essentially the same terms of the Arusha Accords and the FTA. However war-weariness will fade. It is conceivable that gains in Hutu mobility will not be broad enough throughout society. At the same time, any such gains could be taken as zero-sum relative to Tutsi privilege if overall economic growth sags. Thus, tension over ethnic balance in the military could very likely re-emerge as part of a broader resource struggle fought again across ethnic lines.

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