34th IPA Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

FINAL REPORT

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1. INTRODUCTION

What are the priorities for boosting regional and global capacities to respond more consistently and more quickly to violent and destabilizing conflicts in Africa? How can peace operations in Africa be improved to further increase the odds that such conflicts do not recur and development can proceed? In the past year, international attention has concentrated on expanding capacity to conduct peace operations in Africa. To this end, African leaders have set upon improving the African Union (AU)’s ability to handle security and humanitarian problems on the continent. The African Union (AU) has operationalized its Peace and Security Council and has elaborated its plans to develop regional “standby forces” in cooperation with the subregional organizations on the continent. At the Sea Island summit in June 2004, the G8 announced its Global Peace Operations Initiative, in which financial support was pledged to implement the AU’s proposals. The EU has also taken steps to enhance its supporting role through ad hoc efforts in the Sudan and through the establishment of an Africa Peace Support Operation Facility to finance missions. These initiatives also come amidst the United Nations’ (UN) own efforts to improve its headquarters capacity and to establish more effective mechanisms for conducting multinational operations.
However, these initiatives should not obscure one’s appreciation of the current realities. Despite the enormous need and noble pledges of support, external commitments to support peace operations and related capacity-building in all of Africa amounted to only about USD 3 billion in 2004,¹ a meager sum in comparison to commitments elsewhere.² In addition, a prevailing sentiment among officials and officers on the continent is that external contributions have been too scant in areas of real need (e.g. logistical support for deployments). Despite the interest in regional capacities, Africa is also the primary region of operational engagement for the United Nations. Over a third of the UN’s blue helmeted forces are deployed there, and most of them are from countries outside Africa. Finally, the EU’s initiatives come in the wake of its Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite the success of this deployment, it revealed the self-imposed limits that European actors are likely to put on their deployments. It also revealed the magnitude of the assets necessary for effective crisis response—assets that only a world power could pull together so quickly.

¹ This figure is based on the total appropriations for UN operations and for capacity development programs (see Tables 1 and 3). It excludes ad hoc multinational operations, such as the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team and the Nuba Mountains Joint Monitoring Mission in Sudan, and bilateral programs such as the French-led Operation Licorne in Cote d’Ivoire and Belgium’s military training program in Kisangani in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
² For example, expenditures on UN and NATO troops alone in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo averaged over USD 3.5 billion per year between 1995-2003 according to estimates in a study by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security and the University of Bradford. See Chalmers, Malcolm et al. “Annex A”, in Spending to Save: An Analysis of the Cost Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention versus Intervention after the Onset of Violent Conflict, University of Bradford, June 12, 2004. Available at <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/>.
Table 1: Active UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, August 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year of Mandate</th>
<th>Type of Mandate</th>
<th>Mandated strength (Military and Civilian)</th>
<th>2004 Appropriations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; verification</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>USD 44,040,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ch. VII</td>
<td>12,343</td>
<td>USD 746,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ch. VII</td>
<td>10,638</td>
<td>USD 207,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Ethiopia/Eritrea</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; verification</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>USD 216,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ch. VII</td>
<td>16,112</td>
<td>USD 846,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ch. VII</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>USD 211,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ch. VII</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>USD 106,330,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Continental Totals | 57,334 | USD 2,377,660,000 |


The existing gap between aspirations and realities suggests that more consultation is necessary between actors from the continent and external supporters. Such communication is necessary to prevent needless duplication of effort and to ensure that (limited) resources are applied to areas of real (and overwhelming) need.

The Thirty Fourth Annual Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping was convened to address this necessity. The Seminar was jointly hosted by the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Ministry of Defence, the Austrian National
Defence Academy, the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and the International Peace Academy, and it took place at the Diplomatic Academy on June 30 to July 3 2004. The goal was to collect views from practitioners and researchers to feed into the policy agendas of key organizations and states.

It was understood that the goals of the collective initiatives of the AU, G8, EU, and UN amount to a desire to respond more consistently, more quickly, and more effectively to security and humanitarian problems in Africa. Such problems are, overwhelmingly, complex, violent civil conflicts “regionalized” through manifold transborder and substate linkages. The toll of these conflicts is dramatic, amounting in millions of lives lost or ruined and a generation of serious underdevelopment.

In addressing priorities for building capacity to respond to these conflicts, the basic findings of the seminar were as follows: In order to respond more consistently and more quickly, all relevant actors can and should enhance their inter-relations. Mechanisms should be developed and strengthened to ensure that willingness to intervene is most efficiently harnessed. Priority areas include clarifying relations between the AU and subregional organizations, building trust among AU members themselves, and creating menus of options for sustained external logistical support for contingents in peace operations in Africa.
In addressing priorities for improving operations, the basic findings can be summarized as such: The use of force in peace operations should be appropriately institutionalized so that it can efficiently contribute to consolidating peace. Mandates that call for the proactive use of force (Chapter VII mandates) must be provided proper rules of engagement, and force can only help promote peace if it is coupled with a well-designed peace agreement. In addition, the international community must remain vigilant to make sure that consent to the agreement is the most preferable option for parties on the ground, using all available economic, political, and moral sanctions and inducements in addition to the peace operations forces on the ground. Finally, success in peacebuilding requires making appropriate tradeoffs between security, development, and humanitarian priorities in order to make sure all three areas see continual progress.

This report will present a synthesis of the discussions at the conference. The basic findings described above will be discussed in more detail and in turn. The conclusion will discuss some positive and negative implications of current efforts.
2. BUILDING CAPACITY

Efforts to strengthen regional security institutions in Africa are a part of the continuing evolution of the post-Cold War global security architecture. For the countries of Africa, the regional security context is marked by, inter alia, numerous fragmented civil wars, persisting colonial legacies, lower levels of US strategic interest, and inadequate resources for a self-sufficient security system to quell regionalized civil conflicts. Thus, the key security tasks that have demanded attention have been those of multidimensional peace operations. These operations have included an eclectic “cocktail” of regional actors, the UN, external powers, NGOs, and private contractors.

The end of the Cold War introduced a number of factors to which the continent is still responding. The strategic value of the continent diminished for the major powers. State disintegration and consequent regional destabilization in West Africa, Central Africa, and the Horn region were very much associated with the resultant withdrawal of superpower patronage. With the end of the East-West strategic deadlock over the continent’s affairs, the UNTAG mission was finally deployed to assist with elections and consolidating peace, law, and order in the newly independent Namibia in 1989. The deployment came eleven years after the operation had been designed and mandated.
But the enthusiasm of the UN Security Council members to cooperatively intervene in Africa would eventually wane. The shock given to the US Task Force Ranger and UNOSOM in Somalia in 1993 led to the horrific neglect of Rwanda in 1994. The humanitarian impulse of the external powers was dampened. Their attention shifted to the legacy of the Nigerian-led ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention into Liberia, starting in 1990. The external powers seemed all too happy to pass the buck to regional actors who themselves felt compelled to take the lead. Regional security arrangements in Africa, and the once moribund organizations upon which they were based, were thus summoned to prominence.

2.1. Semi-regionalization of security in the Africa

General arguments over the strength and weaknesses of regional security arrangements versus the UN-centered regime are well rehearsed, and many of them were raised again during the discussions at the Vienna seminar. In the context of peace operations in Africa, the issue takes on a nuanced flavor. The development of regionalized approaches resulted in part from the perceived lack of attention from the UN Security Council. In addition, even when Security Council members’ attention has been piqued, as in the cases of Burundi in the mid-1990s, Liberia

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last year, and Sudan currently, the commitment of serious resources has only been through a painfully slow process if they have been committed at all. Finally, the legacy of colonialism has impelled African leaders to assert their own right to manage the continent’s security affairs.\(^4\) Over the past decade, regional security arrangements have been given the license and some means to develop their own capacity. The recent AU initiatives are the latest phase in this evolutionary process.

But importantly, because of resource limitations and questions over legitimacy, regional security arrangements in Africa can hardly be taken as moves toward self-sufficiency. This holds true of the most recent AU initiatives as well. The AU’s new “standby forces” concept, for example, calls for the formation of five brigades to conduct peace operations.\(^5\) This would amount to at most 25,000 troops—about half of what the UN has currently deployed to the continent—and demand for deployments is on the rise. As Table 2 makes clear, AU members currently contribute less than half (43%) of the troops deployed to UN operations in Africa. Given the need for troop rotation and given the likelihood that the brigades will be composed at least partially of the already-deployed troops, the implications are clear. A large gap would remain to be filled for AU member states to assume primary operational responsibility in peace operations on the continent.

\(^4\) See Adebajo’s contribution to this volume.
Table 2: Military troop contributions to UN operations worldwide, June 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within AU region</th>
<th>Outside AU region</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU members</td>
<td>20,523</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>21,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage across regions</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of UN total</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN total</td>
<td>47,380</td>
<td>11,376</td>
<td>58,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage across regions</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In recent peace operations on the continent, UN “absorption” of operations has typically followed initial regional actor engagement. This pattern is evident, for example, in the ongoing operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, and Burundi. All of these operations began as regional-organization-led interventions that were later transformed into UN-managed operations. In these cases, the division of labor that has emerged reflects the relatively quicker response capability of the regional organizations and the significantly larger resource capacity of the UN system. The pattern of peace operations that has emerged is the very opposite, for example, of what has happened in the Balkans. There, the EU and NATO have steadily taken over the long-term peacebuilding activities. The difference in approach is easy to explain: the UN is capable of bringing together vastly more

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6 The regional organizations’ faster response time is not only based on their proximity. Regional organizations do not have to meet as stringent a set of standards before they deploy as troops deploying through the UN. See De Coning, Cedric, “Refining the African Standby Force Concept.” *Conflict Trends*, Vol. 2 (2004). Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that such differences in operational standards have posed serious problems in the inevitable transitions from regional organization operations to UN operations, as discussed below.
resources than African regional and subregional organizations, while the inverse relationship is true when comparing the UN to the EU and NATO.

The current state of affairs might be more appropriately labeled “semi-regionalization” of security in Africa. Such semi-regionalization reflects the difficulties that African regional arrangements have had in providing uniquely “African solutions to African problems.” Semi-regionalization also reflects decisions from within the UN secretariat to not be reliant on African regional organizations. The UN took a lesson from the crisis that emerged after ECOWAS precipitously withdrew from Sierra Leone in 1999-2000 just as the UN mission, UNAMSIL, was establishing itself in the country. UNAMSIL and ECOWAS had agreed to share burdens, and ECOWAS was to make a significant security contribution using its own means. But the UN mission planners did not appreciate the degree of fatigue and frustration that was building within the ECOWAS countries as their calls for additional financing and logistical support seemed to fall on deaf ears in the international community. The lesson learned was that the costs of such naïve dependence on an unstable burden-sharing arrangement were counted in innocent lives lost.

The implication is that boosting capacities for peace operations in Africa requires (1) more efficient organization among

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actors on the continent matched by (2) the enhancement of external support mechanisms. During the course of the seminar, a number of areas of improvement were identified to help achieve these goals. They are discussed below.

2.2. Enhancing relations among actors on the continent

One area of improvement is in relations among actors on the continent. Three priorities were identified: (1) finding ways to manage the “implementation crisis” for the AU’s security initiatives, (2) clarifying the relationship between the AU and the subregional organizations, and (3) improving relations between UN operations in countries that neighbor each other.

2.2.1. Managing the impending “implementation crisis” from within

The legacy of the Organization of African Unity is one of repeated “implementation crises”, in which the high-reaching goals of the organization’s initiatives regularly failed to attain sufficient commitment from the continent’s leaders.\(^8\) Participants at the seminar expressed concern that a similar fate may await the AU’s most recent security initiatives, a concern based significantly on the organization’s own dysfunction. A key reason for the implementation crises, cited at the Vienna seminar, is that the level of trust between AU members has been insufficient. There is no easy way to shift attitudes when the memories of past misdeeds or antagonistic interactions remain trenchant. But such

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\(^8\) This was the subject of discussions that followed by a presentation by Dr. Chris Landsberg. See Landsberg’s contribution to this volume for details on the AU’s institutional reform agenda.
mistrust inhibits the cooperation needed to achieve the AU’s goals. Other reasons are institutional. AU implementation must be continually negotiated among all members, despite their varying levels of commitment to the organization. There had been no accession process through which member countries had to take clear and costly steps to solidify their commitments to the organization. Each AU member is left to wonder about whether contributions to the AU’s goals will be worthwhile. How can a member be sure that its contributions to the peace operations financing pool (proposed to total $200 million per year until 2007) will be applied productively? How can a member be sure that its contribution to AU-led missions will be duly and promptly recompensed, as such contributors can expect when they contribute to UN missions? How can external donors be sure that their contributions will lead to results? It may require that the big states of the continent expend extra resources to get the process going.

2.2.2. Clarifying AU-subregional organization relations

The AU’s security initiatives necessitate a clarification of relations between the AU and subregional organizations. There

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9 As was discussed at the seminar, this distinguishes membership to the AU from the membership to the EU.
are at least 42 subregional organizations and institutions on the continent that would need to be integrated into the AU’s structure.\textsuperscript{12} This task is compounded by the fact that a few of the subregional organization have already developed their own capacities in recent years to conduct robust deployments and/or meditation. The subregional organizations have taken on these roles precisely because both the UN and the AU/OAU have failed to act. Also, regional “lead states” may feel that they would simply be submitting themselves to additional constraints without any perceived benefit, particularly in their own regions. As one seminar participant put it, “the AU will have to earn the right to be the senior authoritative structure on the continent.” Some key questions that will have to be answered include the following: What level of centralization should be established for decision-making and budgetary control? How should external support for subregional capacity development be related to AU structures?

The current AU policy framework relies heavily on the subregional organizations for creating the stand-by forces. But the AU’s efforts in Sudan suggest that a continent-wide “coalition of the willing” approach may be taking hold. Rwanda and Nigeria have taken the lead in offering forces for an expanded AU mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. The AU security policy framework accepts coalitions of the willing as stopgap measures until the subregions come up to speed. But lack of progress in the

\textsuperscript{12} A regional expert presented this figure during the discussions at the seminar.
subregions is not just an issue of one subregion being slower than another because of resource or logistical constraints. Rather, the difference is primarily one of motivation. Only ECOWAS has proven its ability to deploy for robust peace operations. Political differences have plagued past efforts to activate subregional security arrangements in East, Central, and Southern Africa. One wonders if the continent-wide coalitions of the willing approach might be reconsidered as a complement to the subregions-up model in creating a more flexible structure for training arrangements and deployments.

2.2.3. Improving relations between different UN operations

The UN currently has seven operations on the continent, and a number are taking place in countries that neighbor each other, including the operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire, and the operations in the DRC and Burundi. Based on this operational reality and also based on the regional nature of the conflicts across the continent, broad consensus has emerged on the need for “regional approaches”. Such an approach would seek both to address regional conflict linkages and to develop within-region capacity to end civil wars, prevent them from spreading across boundaries, and promote regional economic development.

The UN has tried to implement a regional approach model, with mixed results. The UN office for West Africa (UNOWA) was established to help ECOWAS develop its headquarters capabilities
and to facilitate coordination between the UN operations in the
subregion. But these objectives have been inhibited by two key
problems. First, UNOWA’s office is located in Dakar and not
Abuja (ECOWAS’s headquarters city). The benefits of this
arrangement would seem to come from the distribution of points of
influence within the subregion; to have all subregional centers of
influence in Nigeria may be exacerbate the Francophonie-
Anglophonie tensions within the subregion. Nonetheless, these
benefits need to be weighed against the major logistical
constraints imposed by this arrangement. Conference participants
generally agreed that these logistical constraints made UNOWA’s
role vis-à-vis ECOWAS quite ineffectual.\textsuperscript{13} Second, the UN
operations are mandated to specific countries, and the military and
civilian leaderships answer directly to UN headquarters in New
York. Participation in UNOWA’s efforts has tended to be at the
convenience of operational leaders, reflecting their reluctance to
subordinate their command to another bureaucratic layer.
Participants at the Vienna seminar noted that a product of this
situation was a lack of coordination between the neighboring
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in
West Africa. A lack of data sharing, differing compensation
schemes, and different timing of program activities has created a
perverse DDR “market” in the subregion. Combatants have
sometimes participated in multiple programs to collect

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{13} I thank Mashood Issaka for this point. A similar cost-benefit analysis could also be
applied to the distant locations of the AU (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and NEPAD
(Midrand, South Africa).
\end{footnotesize}

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compensation more than once ("DDR shopping"), resulting in wasted resources and destabilizing flows of combatants across the subregion. These undesirable results suggest the need for a re-think on how a “regional approach” model might be implemented, especially when trying to link existing operations.

2.3. Enhancing relations between external and continental actors

The second area of improvement is in external actors’ relations with actors on the continent. Four key issues were identified: (1) coordinating donor support with AU priorities, (2) recalibrating external support to the operational needs of actors on the continent, (3) institutionalizing external support for sustained operations, and (4) improving relations between the UN (including headquarters and the troop-contributing countries), the AU, and the subregional organizations.

2.3.1. Coordinating donor support with AU priorities

For the AU, it is uncertain whether the new institutional initiatives are likely to draw in significantly more funding from its members, and contributions from external donors may not fill in the resultant financing gaps for new initiatives. The institution has proposed a budget of $200 million per year over the next four years for the implementation of its peace operations capacity-building initiative. This constitutes about a third of its overall
institutional reform budget, and sets a very high goal.\textsuperscript{14} The AU has had a hard time raising the $45 million for its most recent budget. The combined foreign debts of member states are equivalent to about half of their combined GDP.\textsuperscript{15} Current pledges and existing commitments from external supporters (see Table 3) are linked to discrete objectives. It may be that the AU will have to prioritize its objectives for the donor community, with the understanding that not all of its proposals will be implementable. If the AU does not prioritize and initiate consultations, then will the donors do it for the AU?

2.3.2. Recalibrating support to address operational needs

External support programs, such as those being launched by the G8 and the EU, should target the needs of the actors that the programs intend to help. The point should seem obvious—buy-in at the recipient level is necessary for the programs to be successfully implemented. But experience over the past decade has revealed that this obvious point been not been heeded regularly. The RECAMP (France) and the ACRT/ACRI (US) programs failed at first to gain support from those they intended to help because the programs were not developed initially with sufficient consultation.\textsuperscript{16} Actors from the continent saw the

\textsuperscript{14} African Union, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, Vol. 2, Addis Ababa, May 2004, pp. 72-75
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. and IRIN, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{16} See Table 3 for basic information on these programs.
programs as being imposed and misguided.\textsuperscript{17} The situation with these programs has been improved significantly since then, with training being offered for hostile environments and with lethal weapons training now being included. (See Table 3) But participants at the Vienna seminar expressed that additional consultation was necessary to refine these programs, in particular to ensure that the different training programs on the continent adopt compatible operational concepts to permit interoperability.

Other external support initiatives have suffered from similar misinterpretations of the value of what was being offered. SHIRBRIG member countries, for example, have offered to train and provide support on the basis of the SHIRBRIG model.\textsuperscript{18} This model has also been received enthusiastically in the official policy development process for the African stand-by forces. But all key actors on the continent do not share this enthusiasm; this was made clear at the Vienna seminar. SHIRBRIG’s restriction to operating under Chapter VI mandates and its relative lack of operational experience compared to organizations like ECOWAS may make the SHIRBRIG model irrelevant for the areas of highest demand. This should not be confused, of course, with a lack of interest in operational partnerships with SHIRBRIG, as was the case with the SHIRBRIG-ECOMOG cooperation in the September

\textsuperscript{17}For an interesting discussion on why these programs failed to gain support see Frimpong’s contribution to this volume.

\textsuperscript{18}SHIRBRIG (the Standby High-Readiness Brigade) is a multinational brigade formation that can be made available for UN peacekeeping as a rapidly deployable force. Sixteen, mostly European, states participate. For basic information, see <http://www.shirbrig.dk>.
2003 operation to set up an interim headquarters for the transition from ECOMIL to UNAMIL.19

A key point raised repeatedly at the Vienna seminar (and many time elsewhere) was that training programs misdirect external resources and attention away from more important operational needs—in particular, logistical needs such as transportation (both strategic and operational) and basic field equipment (field lodgings, mess facilities, medical facilities, etc.). Officers at the seminar representing a number of African country forces expressed a willingness to deploy, but felt hampered by a lack of such basic logistical resources. Thus, by filling the logistics gap, capacity on the continent might be increased significantly. An important step toward filling this gap could be taken if potential donor countries offered a clearer “menu” of available support options. Such a menu could include options for reimbursement through the UN and through bilateral aid, and options for equipment acquisition through use of UN-owned equipment, direct bilateral support to contingents, and private contractors. The efforts by the EU to offer “one-stop shopping” for provision by European states to UN deployments could be such a welcome step if it were articulated with these needs in mind.

19 See Samii, with Rodriguez, op. cit., p. 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Contributors</th>
<th>AU region recipients**</th>
<th>2004 Budget***</th>
<th>Aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>ECOWAS, CEEAC, and SADC members.</td>
<td>More than USD 11,000,000****</td>
<td>Officer training and field exercises in peacekeeping operations and offensive military operations. Provision of offensive weaponry for training. Doctrine and in-country training module development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operation Facility</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Continent-wide</td>
<td>USD 300,000,000 (trust fund)</td>
<td>Funding for ad hoc negotiations and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Continent-wide</td>
<td>USD 100,000,000</td>
<td>Funding for ad hoc negotiations and operations, and regional organization institutional development. Peace operations training. Peacebuilding program support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Peace</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>SADC region.</td>
<td>USD 870,000</td>
<td>Training of civilian peacekeeping and peacebuilding personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA, formerly ACRI/ACRF)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya.</td>
<td>USD 15,000,000</td>
<td>Training in peacekeeping operations and offensive military operations, including light infantry tactics and small unit tactics. Doctrine and in-country training module development. Provision of offensive weaponry for training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Nigerian, Senegalese, and Ghanaian units in Sierra Leone; Guinean units on</td>
<td>USD 9,000,000</td>
<td>Equip, train, and support troops in peacekeeping operations. Training in offensive military tactics.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Training/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)** | US      | 48 countries in AU region + ECOWAS.  
Liberia border; African troops in the DRC, Burundi, Sudan, and on Eritrea-Ethiopia border. | Transfer of weaponry for training and operations. |
| **Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)** | US      | Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and Tunisia. | Officer training in the US.  
Training in English language, non-lethal operations, and computer simulations.  
Doctrine and in-country training module development. |


* This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but rather to indicate the types and scales of programs that are active to support peace operations capacity development in Africa. It does not include NGO programs and does not include funds budgeted for support to specific operations.

** Recipients since initiation of program.

*** The budget figures are approximations based on publicly available data.

**** Precise budget figures for 2004 (RECAMP IV) are not available because costs are disaggregated across ministries, bureaus, and French military units in Africa. Costs for RECAMP III (“Tanzanite”) were to the tune of EUR 9 million, which is used here as a lower-bound figure for RECAMP IV.
2.3.3. Institutionalizing support for sustained operations

The absorption of nearly all peace recent operations in Africa by the UN reveals the limitations in manpower, equipment, and other resources among regional actors in Africa. In order to nurture a conflict-torn country back to health, long-term operations are necessary. Enhancement of regional capacity to handle these types of operations will require the institutionalization of external support mechanisms for sustained operations. Participants at the Vienna seminar identified a number of related gaps to be filled. The EU has established a new mechanism for funding ad hoc missions, but a complementary mechanism for sustained operations remains to be established. The UK government has taken some positive steps in this regard through programs related to its Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (see Table 3). After the perceived failure of “wet lease” arrangements in some recent operations (particularly in UNAMSIL), new logistical support models have been sought out.\(^\text{20}\) One model is bilateral sponsorship of contingents. France, for example, has provided equipment and support for the Senegalese contingent in MONUC and contingents from Benin, Senegal, Niger, and Togo in UNOCI.\(^\text{21}\) Another area for further exploration is in expanding options for arrangements with private sector logistics contractors. The AU policy framework identifies arrangements with private

\(^{20}\) In the wet lease arrangements, the UN committed to reimburse troop-contributing countries in exchange for their provision of fully-equipped, self-sustaining contingents. See UNDPKO Best Practices Unit, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

\(^{21}\) Correspondence with French Ministry of Defense officials.
contractors as an avenue to explore, particularly for airlift support.\textsuperscript{22} The US seems inclined to favor this option.\textsuperscript{23}

2.3.4. Improving relations between the UN, the AU, and the subregional organizations

At the operational level, UNDPKO itself has identified enhancing coordination mechanisms with the AU and the subregional organizations as a priority.\textsuperscript{24} UNDPKO has come to recognize, it seems, that the Brahimi report recommendations did not adequately address this important dimension of peace operations in Africa—which is remarkable, given that Africa is the site of most of UN operational activity. Some further efforts could include the exchange of liaison officers with operational expertise (as is the case, for example, with the NATO liaison officer at the UN), development of consultative mechanisms through which AU and subregional organization representatives may be able to voice their needs to the Security Council, establishing formal agreements with details on peace operations between the UN and all of the subregional organizations, and sharing operational lessons across organizations.

\textsuperscript{22} AU, Policy Framework, op. cit., p. 12.  
\textsuperscript{24} This is reflected in all recent lessons learned reports for operations in Africa. See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>.  

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Improvement of UN-AU-subregional organization relations should not simply address headquarters-to-headquarters interaction; it must also address the major role of the troop-contributing countries. The UN represents two key elements of current operations in Africa—the first element is the political and operational management element (i.e. the headquarters element), but the second, and equally important, element is the system through which troops are provided to UN missions on the continent. As mentioned above, most of the troops serving in UN missions in Africa are not from African countries (see Table 2). Even if African troops become the majority type deployed on the continent, foreign troops will continue to be a huge part of operations on the continent for the foreseeable future. Enhancement of UN interaction with regional actors in Africa should be viewed as an exercise in improving the relations between troop-contributing countries, the UN secretariat (which includes UNDPKO), the UN Security Council, the AU, and the subregional organizations. The recommendations to provide clearer “menus” for logistical support operations and institutionalizing support for sustained operations apply just as well to the troop-contributing countries.
3. IMPROVING OPERATIONS

Peace operations in Africa bring together a broad array of actors and approaches, raising issues of prioritization and integration. Most current peace operations in Africa are marked by a number of traits. First, most of the UN missions on the continent are Chapter VII operations. The sense in the mid-1990s was that the UN would no longer engage in large-scale peace enforcement, but this sense proved wrong. Troop levels have risen to well above the previous peak in 1993 to help the continent cope with a profusion of conflicts affecting hundreds of millions of lives. (See Figures 1 and 2) Second, the main troop-contributing countries have almost no power in the Security Council mandating process. In addition, external powers have proved unwilling to operate within the UN framework. Thus, the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council mandate risky operations that they would prefer to pass on to the poorer troop-contributing countries. The UN, essentially acting at the service of the Security Council, can hardly say no. This condition, sometimes referred to as “peacekeeping apartheid”, has potentially negative consequences for the coherence the

25 Of course, the exceptions are the MINURSO and UNMEE monitoring and verification operations.
26 Such is the case even when external powers do intervene, as with the UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, France’s continuing efforts in Cote d’Ivoire, the EU’s Operation Artemis in the DRC last year, and the small US deployment to Liberia last year. In none of these cases were the major power forces integrated into the UN operation. This is in contrast, for example, to the Australian-led INTERFET forces in East Timor, which stayed on and integrated their efforts into the ensuing UN operation.
relationship between mandates and actual operations. Finally, these operations are multidimensional missions, emphasizing DDR and linked to institution-building and social recovery programs.

Figure 1: Number of UN troops deployed to the AU region, 1993-2004

![Graph showing the number of UN troops deployed to the AU region from 1993 to 2004.](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/)


Figure 2: Combined population of AU member states with active armed conflicts, 1993-2003

![Graph showing the combined population of AU member states with active armed conflicts from 1993 to 2003.](http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/)

Based on these operational realities in Africa, discussions at the Vienna seminar focused on two key areas of improvement. The first area concerned how force ought to be used and institutionalized in a complex mission. The discussion touched on issues relating to rules of engagement and limits to the utility of force. The second area concerned the management of security, development, and humanitarian priorities in multi-dimensional operations. In such operations, urgent needs are multiple and simultaneous, but resources are limited. Success requires that mission leaderships master the art of trading off between security, development, and humanitarian needs to ensure long-term progress in all three areas. Experience in recent operations shows that these tradeoffs are particularly sensitive with respect to DDR, transitional justice, and child protection. At the same time, these are crucial elements of peace operations in Africa, either because they are taken as essential to progress in peace processes (DDR and transitional justice) or because they are simply too ubiquitous to ignore (child protection issues).

3.1. Institutionalizing force

Issues related to the use of force were high on the agenda at the Vienna seminar, given the prominence of Chapter VII mandates in Africa and the AU’s interest in developing capacities to handle enforcement missions. The implication of a Chapter VII mandate is that force is accepted as a crucial element in the peace operation. The role of force in such operations is typically
to either protect the mission personnel and civilians from aggression or, in some cases, to bring an end to fighting between belligerent parties. As such, the aim is to deter or actively prevent aggression, protect civilians, and generate consent to a peace process. A proper match between the mandate and the rules of engagement is obviously necessary for the mandate to be fulfilled; but such a proper match has not always been established. In addition, in developing models for peace operations in Africa, the international community should be well aware of the constraints on the utility of force, and thus develop mandates and operational models based upon this awareness.

Table 4: Six strategic considerations for peace operations mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary strategic question</th>
<th>Secondary questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does proposed mission make sense on its own terms?</td>
<td>• Do the means in the mandate match its objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Were all implementing parties engaged in negotiating the relevant peace agreement and in devising the mandate?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Do mandates address causes of continued fighting (e.g. economic agendas or political representation)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Does the mission make sense in the current worldwide context?</td>
<td>• Is there headquarters capacity to handle a new operation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Will the new operation dilute commitment of key resources (e.g. Francophone police or major power militaries) to other operations? Will this undermine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Should the mandate invoke Chapter VI or Chapter VII?
- If Chapter VI is invoked, is there a strong likelihood that Chapter VII will eventually have to be invoked?
- Is the decision based on the best local knowledge or on interpretations from a distance (e.g. UN HQ or capitals)?

### 4. Should the operation be integrated?
- What are potential troop contributors’ attitudes toward SRSG control over troops?
- If integration is not possible, then are adequate communication structures in place at all levels between security, development, and humanitarian actors?

### 5. Are all partners identified and engaged?
- Are all other organizations involved in the target area engaged?
- Are all intra-organizational partners engaged (e.g., in the UN, UNDP, UNHCR, etc.)?
- Are relevant regional hegemons or major powers engaged?
- Are there bilateral relationships that may be helpful or hindering?

### 6. Is there a strategic concept for ending the mission?
- Would a very long-term sustained presence be worthwhile (e.g. as, arguably, has been the case in Cyprus)?
- What are the incremental goals of the mission?
- What are the benchmarks to indicate that the mission can and should be concluded?

Source: Adapted from presentation delivered at the 2004 Vienna seminar by Dr. David Harland, Chief, Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO.
3.1.1. Matching mandates and rules of engagement

Experience from the field has shown that mission mandates are regularly interpreted in different ways at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As a result, the coherence of the mission suffers and expectations are often dangerously misaligned. Part of the problem, of course, is that the countries that make the mandates are not the same ones that serve in the missions. The Brahimi report had raised this issue, and UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1353 (June 2001) established UNSC consultation mechanisms for troop-contributing countries. Nonetheless, these prescriptions seem not to have cured the problem. Participants noted, for example, that when MONUC was authorized to use “all necessary means” under Chapter VII in UN Security Council Resolution 1493 (July 2003), the rules of engagement for contingents on the ground were not updated. Contingents continued to operate under the old rules, which prohibited any active intervention. The result has been differences in public expectations of what the forces are meant to do, damaging the mission’s credibility. For example, following MONUC’s inability to stop a June 2004 siege by mutinous forces in the eastern city of Bukavu, demonstrators took to the streets in

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27 Seminar participants involved with MONUC stressed this point repeatedly. The new mandate ensured that there would be no imbalance between MONUC and “the IEMF [Interim Emergency Multinational Force, or, Operation Artemis] from which the UN mission had to take over [in Ituri].” Rogier, Emeric. “MONUC and the Challenges of Peace Implementation in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Participant’s Perspective.” Report on ISS International Experts Workshop, Pretoria: ISS, September 2003, p.5. See Box 1 in this report for some operational details of Operation Artemis.
Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisi, Bukavu, and Goma, riotously protesting the impotence and passivity of the UN force.28

MONUC’s troubles have also demonstrated the difficulties of “scaling up” a mission. The difficulty is based on a number of constraints. Changing a mandate is insufficient if forces on the ground do not update their perceptions of what they are supposed to be doing. Countries that contribute to Chapter VI missions may get cold feet once they recognize the implications of the Chapter VII mandate, introducing unanticipated troop-withdrawal crises in an operation. These constraints were evident in the seven months that it took for MONUC to scale up to Chapter VII capabilities in eastern DRC.29 A lesson learned is that if there is reason to believe that enforcement will be necessary, then the operation should be mandated as Chapter VII from the outset (see Table 4).

Finally, given the eclectic “cocktail” of actors engaged in peace operations in Africa, an important area of concern is the harmonization of operational concepts, particularly parameters on the use of force. In developing African capacity, it may be useful to draw from EU-UN experiences. For example, the EU and the UN have different definitions for “force” and for other operational concepts, complicating their coordination.30 The AU policy framework hopes to prevent such a mismatch by developing

29 Figure cited at the seminar.
30 See Lubenik’s contribution to this volume.
capacities using UN parameters. But the experience in the conversion of the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone into UNAMSIL shows that formal harmonization may be insufficient; there may be difficulties in harmonizing between different “operational cultures” across organizations and contributors.  

Formal procedures cannot harmonize conflicting attitudes on how force should be used and how complex tasks should be carried out. Joint training and joint experience are necessary.

3.1.2. Constraints on the utility of force

Discussions at the seminar touched on a number of factors that constrain the utility of force in peace operations in Africa. These include low levels of troops availability compared to operational need and limited political and operational intelligence compared to the complexity of many conflicts.

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31 See UNDPKO Best Practices Unit, op. cit., p. 33.
Box 1: Operational Lessons from “Artemis”

The French-led, EU Operation “Artemis” to Bunia in the DRC was deployed from June 1 to September 1, 2003 to help stave off an impending massacre and to facilitate the expansion of MONUC’s presence into the Ituri region by securing the local air field.

At the seminar, Artemis was generally hailed as a success despite being a very limited operation. Discussions at the seminar reflected on elements that contributed to this success. The skill of the personnel involved in the mission was very highly regarded. In addition, the troops’ French-language capabilities were taken as a major asset, allowing for more effective intelligence gathering and, as a result, more credibility on the ground.

Artemis also demonstrated the magnitude of the logistical capabilities required to conduct crisis response in a theater of operations as vast as the DRC. The deployment to Bunia required 243 flights from Entebbe, Uganda over three and a half weeks to place about 1,050 troops, 318 vehicles, and 740 tons of supply. The fact that the operation sustained no casualties meant that there was no need for additional medivac flights; the fact that the force was tightly concentrated around Bunia meant that there was no need for extensive helicopters resupply relays. Neither of these factors should necessarily be taken for granted in such crisis response missions.

Artemis would fall under the “Scenario 5” category of the AU stand-by force policy framework. It has been acknowledged in the AU’s official implementation process that such operations will remain beyond the reach of any AU-led forces. The implication, of course, is that either national militaries in Africa expand their capabilities to fill the gap or that western forces are assumed to fill this gap. Given the current state of strategic transport capabilities on the continent, the latter option is more realistic for the near future.

Operations in Africa will never have enough escalation capacity to impose peace where the will to peace does not already exist.\(^\text{32}\) Even recently successful models may be difficult to replicate. In Sierra Leone, a troop to population ratio of about 3:1000 and a strong UK “over-the-horizon” capacity were sufficient for UNAMSIL to help consolidate the peace.\(^\text{33}\) If the situation were to deteriorate in Cote d’Ivoire, such a model would translate into a force of over 50,000 to accompany the French rapid reaction

\(^{32}\text{Based on the history of counterinsurgency, troop to population ratios of 10:1000 to 20:1000 are often used as standards for the amount of force needed to actively push parties into a peace process. In Cote d’Ivoire, this would amount to a deployed force of 160,000-320,000, and in the DRC 600,000-1.2 million! See Quinlivan, James. “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 59-69.}\n
\(^{33}\text{The UK has maintained an amphibious rapid reaction force and held training exercises off of Sierra Leone’s coast as part of their expressed commitment to the peace process.}\n
troops. In the DRC this would translate into an inconceivably large force of 180,000, for which an over the horizon capacity would have to involve very serious capabilities (see Box 1 on the assets required to conduct Operation Artemis). Of course these are simplistic calculations, but they help to emphasize an important point: force in such peace operations can only be useful as an element embedded in a propitious political context.

Force is only useful if it is matched by sufficient political and operational intelligence. The political complexity of the conflicts is amplified by the challenges of bush and jungle terrain and, at times, urban environments. The UN has made some moves to enhance its intelligence gathering capacity, following from the Brahimi report recommendations. Lessons continue to be learned in the field. An important lesson from the French led Operation Artemis was a relatively simple one: being able to speak the language of inhabitants of the mission area provides a major boost to effectiveness. (See Box 1) Seminar participants agreed that intelligence issues in peace operations should receive considerably more detailed attention.

3.2. Peace agreements and political frameworks

Given the constraints on the utility of force, participants noted that peace operations in Africa depend heavily on the design of peace agreements and, often, on economic incentives. Discussions at the seminar suggested that these two factors deserve further investigation, particularly their relationship to each
other. A peace agreement serves as a constitutive framework for the restoration of political order. For many conflicts in Africa today, fair management of natural resources is a crucial element in such a constitutive framework. It was pointed out that the 1999 Lome Agreement of the peace process in Sierra Leone had explicit provisions for managing natural resources, but that the agreement did not stick. The Global Accord in the DRC, however, does not contain extensive provisions for governing natural resources; participants involved in the peace process there cited this as a dangerous omission. The implication is that there is a complex relationship between a number of key factors. These factors include the degree to which belligerents are willing to commit to the agreement, the degree to which the agreement is silent on crucial factors like resource management, and the degree to which an agreement will allow for progress in peacebuilding. Careful analysis of these factors is needed to identify how the right balances can be found.

The strength of a peace agreement is dependent on the will of the parties on the ground to maintain commitments to the agreement. But external parties should certainly work to shore up the local parties’ commitment to an agreement throughout the implementation process. Participants noted that the international community has failed to live up to this obligation with respect to the Global Accord governing the peace process in the DRC. External pressure—in the form of economic, political, and moral sanctions and inducements—flagged after the establishment of

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the transitional government, and this has allowed the peace process to slip off track.

The degree of specificity and coherence of a political framework also affects the degree to which force can promote peacebuilding. It is useful to take a lesson from elsewhere on the relationship between force levels and a political framework: the outbreak of major riots last March in Kosovo came despite the placement of KFOR’s four brigades and specialized unit; without a coherent political framework, even the world’s best forces cannot absolutely prevent disaffected groups from aggressively and violently taking matters into their own hands. The reverse situation prevails with respect to the Nuba Mountains Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM) in central Sudan. There, a ceasefire agreement drawn up in 2002 with significant local actor participation has allowed a lean intervening monitoring presence to be reasonably successful in helping to build peace. Regularized joint consultations between the JMM and the parties to the agreement have been crucial in pushing the peacebuilding process forward. The value of such deep and regularized joint participation should not be overlooked.

3.3. Balancing priorities in peacebuilding

Mission mandates for peace operations have expanded to include elements of economic and social recovery. Operations

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34 For details on the Join Monitoring Mission, see Wilhemsen’s contribution to this volume.
thus combine security, development, and humanitarian goals. In the long run, attainment of each of these goals helps to promote the attainment of the others. But in the short run, operations are often faced with dilemmas involving tradeoffs between immediate needs in each of these three areas. These dilemmas produce tensions within an operation that are often times unavoidable. During the discussions at the seminar, a number of important tensions were discussed, particularly those that are related to DDR, transitional justice, and child protection.

3.3.1. DDR

Discussions at the seminar touched on the manner in which DDR priorities should be balanced against other development and humanitarian concerns. Focusing on ex-combatants, some argue, comes at the expense of providing relief for larger, more needy populations. For example, according to UN-OCHA figures on conflicts in Africa, there are often 10-20 refugees and internally displaced persons for every combatant that is to be disarmed.\(^{35}\) There is also concern that “rewarding combatants” through targeted reintegration programs may send the wrong signal. Finally, combatant dependents may not be identified for targeted benefits, leaving them with few opportunities for their own reintegration. Many participants at the seminar favored a “holistic” and “community” approach to reintegration programs that

\(^{35}\) These figures are based on regular UN-OCHA reports as distributed via ReliefWeb <http://www.reliefweb.int>.
addresses these tradeoffs with fairness and at the community level.

Nonetheless, such an approach to DDR must still pay heed to the technical soundness of disarmament and demobilization operations. Disarmament and demobilization operations are phases of a peace process during which poor design can precipitate avoidable crises. Such was the case during the early start of the DDR program in Liberia in December 2003.\textsuperscript{36} It has become accepted wisdom that local authorities should have some ownership over DDR. But participants at the seminar questioned whether local authorities should have complete discretion over the disarmament and demobilization phases of DDR when their commitments to the process may not be credible and when operational flaws can have disastrous consequences. Such questioning was targeted at the current programs in the eastern DRC and in Burundi.

3.3.2. Transitional justice and peace operations

A key tension in the relationship between transitional justice and peace processes is the tradeoff between strengthening human rights norms and attaining immediate agreement to a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{37} At the seminar, a widely held view was that justice mechanisms should be initiated as quickly as possible, but


\textsuperscript{37} For a more general discussion of issues of transitional justice in peace operations, see Sriram’s contribution to this volume.
that the process may also necessarily be a long term one. In some cases “as quickly as possible” may mean that significant time must pass. As an example, in Zimbabwe, proceedings to bring about justice and reconciliation following the atrocities committed by the Fifth Brigade in Matebeleland in the 1980s were not initiated until ten years later. Recent events related to the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court in Sierra Leone have also demonstrated how the complex contingencies of peace processes make it difficult to unwaveringly pursue transitional justice. Taylor was not arrested while attending peace talks in Accra after the indictment against him was unsealed, and neither the AU nor ECOWAS have pushed to have Taylor extradited from his refuge in Nigeria to the Special Court.\textsuperscript{38} The regional nature of the conflicts in West Africa and, reflexively, the peace process there make this tradeoff especially difficult to master.

3.3.3. Child protection and child soldiers

Dilemmas related to child protection and child soldiers are unavoidable in peace operations in Africa.\textsuperscript{39} For example, in Sierra Leone, half of the population is under the age of 18, and 10,000 out of 70,000 combatants are estimated to have been children. On the one hand, children constitute a high number of innocent bystanders in a conflict zone, and their protection is


\textsuperscript{39} For more discussion on child protection issues, see Theuermann’s contribution to this volume.
paramount. On the other hand, the unpredictability of the behavior of child soldiers means that their presence significantly increases the riskiness of a conflict zone. In addition, organizations like UNICEF simply do not have the resources to deal with all child-related issues in such conflict zones. Finally, guidelines for behavior vis-à-vis children in conflict zones are not clear-cut. Child combatants are not afforded any special status in the laws of war, and identification mechanisms like birth certificates are often nonexistent.

A number of ways to handle child protection dilemmas were identified during the discussions at the seminar. Proposals to include training modules and stress counseling in operational training were favorably received. Experience from the field has shown that certain types of local figures, like religious leaders and teachers, can be important partners in securing the release of child soldiers from combatant groups. Finally, preventing a child from returning to combat requires a sustained approach to reintegration. Conflicts disrupt social value systems, thus one cannot assume that traditional patterns of relationships will still exist to absorb children.
4. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The efforts described and the measures suggested above have the aim of boosting capacity for peace operations in Africa—that is, to enhance the ability of regional actors and organizations in Africa, of external countries, and of the UN system to respond more quickly, consistently, and effectively in order to halt violent and destabilizing conflicts on the continent. This aim is also linked to a number of greater goals for the continent. By halting such conflicts, a political context may be created in which economic growth may proceed and human rights may be less vulnerable to abuse. Many of the conflicts in Africa are over the continent’s wealth of extractable resources. The implication is that a halt to such conflicts could produce an enormous peace dividend.

Nonetheless, it is also worthwhile to think through some of the possible drawbacks of such initiatives. For one thing, concentrated attention on expanding peace operations capacity steals attention away from other issues of concern. While contributions from, say, Rwanda and even pledges from Somalia’s Transitional National Government may be welcomed in the context of the AU standby forces agenda, they also raise questions.\(^40\) To what extent will such contributions distract from progress on reforms within the contributing countries themselves, especially in

\(^{40}\) Rwanda has been a lead actor in the AU monitoring force in the Darfur region of Sudan. On Somalia, which has pledged 150 troops to the East African brigade as part of the AU effort, see Majtenyi, Cathy. “Somalia Expected to Contribute African Peacekeepers,” Voice of America, September 14, 2004.
the security sector, in institutionalizing the rule of law, and in establishing representative political institutions? Outcomes over the past decade and half in other countries—in Pakistan, Nepal, and in other major troop contributing countries—do not show that contributions to UN peacekeeping necessarily correspond to progressive domestic institutional change through socialization to UN norms or other such processes. Is there reason to believe that the results will be different within the AU?

One also wonders to what degree the AU initiatives are being conducted with the interests of the continent’s citizens in mind. It is ironic that once democracy began to flourish in Nigeria with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, the country’s leadership began to feel pressure to withdraw Nigerian troops from the peace operation in Sierra Leone. Similar pressures were felt in other countries in the sub-region—all of which contributed to the ECOWAS’s precipitous withdrawal in 2000. Would democratization in the AU member states create impediments to the AU’s agenda? If so, what does this suggest about the value of the AU’s agenda?

Finally, progress across the continent toward reaching governance and human rights goals has been lagging despite pledges made via the NEPAD framework and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa. This

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41 I thank Dorina Bekoe for this point.
42 See Nowrojee, op. cit.
leads one to wonder whether the effort of military and political elites to implement the AU’s security agenda is an example of dealing with symptoms but avoiding the disease. If peace operations are to minimize the likelihood that violent conflict recurs in a war-torn country, institutional measures must be introduced that effectively target the interests of all relevant parties to the conflicts. External actors intervening in Africa have shown that they have neither the knowledge nor the stamina to solve such complex puzzles. Regional actors may be better endowed in both ways. But the question remains: do regional actors have the necessary credibility?